Roundtable 1: How to make the migration-development nexus work for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

Session 1.3: Addressing the root causes of migration through development, specifically in light of the current global economic crisis

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Input to the background paper has also been provided by
IOM, OECD and UNDP Human Development Report Office

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ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF MIGRATION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT SPECIFICALLY
IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Executive Summary

The ongoing economic crisis is likely to have a number of effects on the migration and development nexus. History suggests that inflows to destination countries are likely to slow, and that there may be some increases in returns. This could impact on development through a range of mechanisms, including fewer opportunities to migrate, lower remittances, and potentially poorer conditions for migrants. Evidence from past crises and emerging evidence suggest that impacts are likely to be complex however, and appropriate policy responses will need to be highly country specific, evidence based, and supportive of economic recovery.

Rationale

The root causes of migration are primarily economic. Hence, any significant deterioration in economic indicators that is the direct consequence of an economic downturn is likely to be reflected in some kind of consequence for the volume and the direction of population migration and hence for the impact of that migration on origin and destination countries as well as on the migrants themselves. Perhaps the most critically important of these economic indicators is the unemployment rate. An increase in the numbers being thrust out of work might be expected to impact upon migration in three major ways. First, if migrants are among those increasingly without work in destination economies, will they go home? Second, a rising unemployment rate in destination economies might slow or divert migration away from that place of rising unemployment. Third, rising unemployment in origin economies might encourage more to leave to seek opportunity elsewhere, irrespective of conditions in potential destinations.

Development is difficult to define succinctly but implies that people’s wellbeing is improving, not just economically but more broadly. The international community came up with a series of indicators by which to measure development progress, the Millennium Development Goals. Despite their quite limited range, they have provided a consensus around which governments can agree on what development should mean: the reduction of poverty, increasing access to health and education, the elimination of inequalities between genders and so on. For this reason, they still remain the basic indicators of what we mean by development.

In terms of the impact that the current economic crisis can have on migration and development, four potentially significant areas can be envisaged:
• A decline in remittances to countries of origin as migrants lose their jobs. As remittances make up one of the most significant flows of money to developing economies, the impact of their loss potentially seems to prejudice the development of the economies. In 2008, for example, remittances to Mexico fell by $1 billion to $25 billion primarily as a consequence of rising unemployment in the United States.

• An increase in return of migrants to economies that are already weak and unprepared to absorb growing numbers of job seekers who have been used to relatively high wages. Such a return could have significant political as well as economic implications for development.

• Rising unemployment may exacerbate tensions between host country nationals and migrant groups, resulting in xenophobia and social unrest, negatively affecting migrants rights.

• Rising unemployment may have different impacts on vulnerable groups such as female migrants.

Underlying the global patterns of international migration, however, are deep structural imbalances in levels of economic, social and political development that drive people to move from one part of the world to another. Higher wages and salaries in one part of the world “pull” people towards those areas, while the converse, low wages and salaries, “push” people away from those areas. The relative availability of jobs, education and health services, and so on, are seen to provide basic pushes and pulls that make up the root causes of migration. Rarely, however, can migration be simply related to these few variables. For example, it is foreseeable that migration may occur as a result of environmental factors and the effects of climate change, where migration may be out of necessity rather than by choice. Migration is also a function of previous migration in that it builds upon itself through migrant networks. Early migrants send back word to friends and relatives about opportunities in destination areas, which leads to further migration. These underlying inequalities and networks essentially control the volume and direction of population flows upon which short-term shocks or crises introduce fluctuations. Policy tends to respond to these short-term issues and needs. However, the deeper underlying conditions that drive migration always need to be kept in mind when addressing what is likely to be a relatively short-term downturn in the economy.

The current economic crisis and migration
The current crisis has seen levels of economic growth contract and global economic growth rates being constantly revised downwards, to 0.5 per cent in 2009. This average covers a significant variation among countries and, although a global crisis exists, the impact and repercussions vary from one part of the world to another. Some economies, such as China, have continued to grow, albeit at a sharply lower rate compared with previous years, though the most recent data for the second quarter of 2009 already suggest an upturn. India and Bangladesh slowed in 2009 compared with 2008 but still maintained relatively rapid growth rates of 5 per cent or more. Latin America is already in negative growth and advanced economies such as the Eurozone contracted by perhaps -2.0 per cent, with the United Kingdom alone estimated to contract by -4.1 per cent in 2009. The United States is estimated to contract by -2.8 per cent in 2009.
Hence, any assessment of the impact of the economic slowdown on migration will have to take these regional variations into consideration. Globally, the International Labour Organization estimates that as many as 51 million jobs could be lost in 2009 because of the global recession. With more limited resources available, governments are more hard pressed to address the issue of rising unemployment and its consequences.

Perhaps the major difficulty in arriving at an assessment of the impact of the crisis on migration is the lack of comprehensive timely data. Data on migration in general tend to be problematic; this is even more so in the case of such a recent event as the crisis. Many unknowns remain but already preliminary information is emerging from national and international organizations that allow some tentative points to be made. Two contextual points need to be emphasized. First, the impact of the crisis on migration and development varies across countries, type of migration (whether temporary or permanent, regular or irregular, etc), age, gender and level of education. Second, the current crisis is not a unique event. While all economic crises may be different, the global economy has experienced significant downturns in the past and lessons may be learned from these experiences. For example, the return of migrant workers did accelerate after the oil shocks of the 1970s but, quite quickly, migration resumed, although of a qualitatively different type with joining family members making up a greater proportion of the flows. Very large numbers of migrants returned home after the first Gulf conflict in 1990-91. Of the 1.18 million who left Kuwait and Iraq, some 540,000 returned to Egypt and Jordan, 125,000 went back to India, 60,000 to Bangladesh and 53,000 to Pakistan. The fears of social unrest at the time were unfounded and the majority of migrants were more concerned about remigration than being absorbed into local labour markets. While it is dangerous to draw easy parallels, Tajiks who have returned home today may also either just be waiting either for things to improve in Russia, or for an opportunity to attempt to access less-affected markets such as the Czech Republic or South Korea.

Government information campaigns or the establishment of placement offices, perhaps with international assistance, might help in such cases. Data concerning the impact of migration after the 1997 Asian financial crisis showed that, after initial repatriations and declines in regional labour migration, the situation returned to renewed growth in numbers, certainly within two years. Malaysia, after the initial large-scale returns of workers to Indonesia, was actively recruiting again within a matter of months. Studies of the aftermath of the impact of the 1973-74 oil shocks on migration to Europe showed that, again, after an initial sharp decline in the numbers of migrant workers and considerable homeward movements, migration resumed, although of a different type. The movement of workers was replaced by the migration of the families of those workers who remained, and destination country policies increasingly focused on integration issues.

Evidence from previous economic downturns in the United Kingdom suggests that any return of migrants does not free jobs for newly unemployed host country nationals. As in the case of the Asian crisis, the
location of the newly unemployed host country nationals and the jobs freed by migrants were neither in the same place nor at the same level. Migrants and locals tend to do different things in different places.

Evidence from the OECD on the impact of the current crisis so far suggests that applications to the United States, Spain and Australia through employer-nominated or skilled temporary migration programmes appear to have declined in recent months compared with previous years. Falls in applications for the Workers Registration Scheme in the UK in the first quarter of 2009 were down by more than half compared with a year earlier, and a similar fall was observed for Ireland in terms of migrant registrations from new EU member states. Developed economies as different as Australia, Italy and the Republic of Korea are also lowering the targets for their intake of both skilled and unskilled migrant workers in the face of increasing domestic unemployment. Yet, other countries have started to provide incentives to encourage migrants already within their borders to return home. A decline in remittance flows has already been recorded in a number of developing countries of origin, with negative ramifications for development at the local and potentially regional and national levels. In terms of remittances, World Bank estimates project a 7-10 per cent decline in 2009, following double-digit growth in previous years, but a resumption of growth is expected from 2010. This 2009 decline is small relative to expected reductions in private investment.

Strong variation in remittance flow exists across countries and regions. The decline is most marked to Latin America, perhaps reflecting the importance of the United States as a destination for migration from this region, and the early onset of the recession in the US. Remittance flows to South and East Asia have continued to grow strongly in 2009, with Pakistan showing a marked acceleration in receipt of remittances. This reflects the fact that oil-producing countries of West Asia have maintained their growth with robust oil prices and that they have continued to hire migrant workers.

Clearly, the impact that the crisis will have on migration and development will depend upon the length and depth of the crisis, and this is still largely unknown. Nevertheless, the preliminary indications are that the trends are as expected: a slowing in migration to principal destinations; some evidence, although not strong, of increasing return from these destinations; and a decline in remittances, although neither the return nor the decline is global or as great as might first have been anticipated. The migration will be complicated by a return of expatriates to developed economies as global business opportunities contract overseas. More fundamentally, although unemployment among migrants overall is increasing, considerable variation by sector and by country exists, though little analysis has been done on such variations. For example, in Spain, the unemployment rate for migrants 15-64 years old in the fourth quarter of 2008 was 20.3 per cent. The equivalent unemployment rate for host country nationals was 12.5 per cent. This pattern of higher migrant unemployment was repeated across many of the OECD countries. Broadly, across much of the OECD area, unemployment increased faster for migrants than for host country nationals, although exceptions such as the United Kingdom appeared to exist.
Sectoral differences are also important. The downturn has particularly affected the construction sector where male migrants tend to be concentrated. On the other hand, the demand for health care is not going to diminish in a time of crisis and that is a sector in many developed economies that is heavily dependent upon migrant workers, and particularly women workers. However, it cannot be concluded that women are in more resilient work. Large numbers are in unregulated sectors such as domestic work, with little protection in times of crisis. In summary, considerable variation by country, by sector and by gender can be expected. A rise in temporary and part-time employment may also emerge as a response to the crisis, resulting in increased numbers of workers who have few rights and who can be hired and fired quickly as economic conditions change. Migrants tend to be over-represented in such temporary and part-time employment, which contributes to their overall higher unemployment in OECD countries as a whole.

Policies and practices

Policies and practices are going to vary very generally depending upon whether a country is an origin, destination or transit country. Such a division is artificial as advanced economies in the Global North are also countries of emigration, often of skilled migrants working overseas, but also of retirees. Countries of origin of migration in the Global South also have immigration, often of skilled migrants to provide basic services, as well as development assistance, but they may also host refugee or regionally displaced populations. Significant South-South flows of unskilled migrants also exist, although the crisis does not yet appear significantly to have impacted upon the largest of these flows, the movements of workers from South Asia to the oil-rich economies of West Asia. Hence, policies need to address several types of populations in each case and these will each be affected by the recession in different ways.

Countries of destination
It is likely that destination countries will take the most proactive steps to deal with migrants by limiting the numbers of new arrivals and by encouraging unemployed migrants to leave. Although most OECD countries have taken little action to limit their labour migration schemes, a few examples do exist with Spain cutting its work permit quota for 2009 and the United Kingdom tightening the academic and financial criteria under the Points Based System. In Asia, Malaysia has cut back the number of workers it recruits and increased the numbers being sent back. The work visas of 55,000 Bangladeshi workers were revoked from early March 2009 but, even if all are ultimately sent back they represent a relatively small proportion of the Bangladeshis in Malaysia. The two countries have held high level consultations on this matter. Malaysia has been operating a continuous programme to reduce the number of irregular migrants in the country and some 171,000 workers, who registered in an amnesty during the last two months of 2008, some 86 per cent of whom were from Indonesia, agreed to be returned home. The recession may have
brought some urgency to the repatriations but these measures have been part of a long-running campaign to reduce irregular migration and it is perhaps difficult to isolate a specific "recession effect".

Spain, with a migrant unemployment rate of over 20 per cent and some 400,000 unemployed migrants at the end of 2008, has offered legal migrants who have become unemployed their unemployment entitlement as a lump sum on condition that they return home and do not return to Spain for at least three years. Few appear to have taken advantage of this offer, mainly because conditions in their home countries in South America and eastern Europe have also deteriorated during the recession but also because of the condition that they cannot return to Spain for such a long period should the economy improve. Many will prefer to try to wait out the crisis. The Czech government has also offered incentives to unemployed workers to go back home in a programme that seems to have had more success, with perhaps some 5,000 returning. The reason for the greater success of this programme may be the fact that no time restriction exists on when they can return to the Czech Republic.

Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that large numbers of eastern Europeans have returned home from the United Kingdom as unemployment has risen, and particularly to Poland. However, with an appreciation of the local currency, the zloty, of 30 per cent against the pound and a growing economy at home, it makes sense for some to return, irrespective of the recession. The Polish government even operates an information campaign to encourage its citizens to return. Where freedom of movement across countries exists, such as within the EU, return movement is likely to be more of a viable option compared with cases where distance and immigration barriers, bureaucratic as well as physical, make re-entry expensive, time-consuming and difficult.

With respect to the traditional countries of immigration, Australia, Canada and the United States, it seems unlikely that the recession will have a major impact on the policies of their permanent immigration programmes, which are still weighted towards family reunification. Australia has lowered its annual target in the face of rising domestic unemployment, unlike Canada or the United States, but, for all the major settler countries, there are sufficient people in the lengthy process of gaining legal entry for numbers not to be influenced by short-term economic fluctuations. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that, overall, numbers of migrants to the United States have slowed since 2007, when the recession officially began in that country. Irregular migration, particularly from Mexico, seems to have slowed and is the only major component of the migration to the United States that is sensitive to changing economic conditions. Hence, the role of policy in the largest destination country in the world appears to be to stabilize numbers through a recession, whereas those entrants who come in under the policy net self-regulate. The degree of that self-regulation will be very much dependent upon the state of the economy in countries of origin. Recessions, which traditionally begin in the most advanced economies, diffuse outwards to countries of origin, and an upturn in irregular migration may be anticipated if the economy of Mexico slows markedly. So far,
however, no evidence exists to support this hypothesis. Although Canada maintains its annual immigrant target, it also appears to have reduced some of its temporary non-immigrant programmes.

Given the cost and difficulty of returning to Latin America, particularly for irregular migrants, little evidence of return migration yet exists, despite rising unemployment among the foreign-born Hispanic population in the United States from 4.5 to 6.4 per cent between 2007 and 2008. Some 250,000 Hispanics lost their jobs in the construction sector during 2007. Migrants in the United States and most developed economies tend to be concentrated in some of the most vulnerable parts of the economy, in construction, the hospitality industry and in manufacturing; other sectors have not been so affected, the health sector for more skilled migrants, but also agriculture. Although the data are far from conclusive, it does seem likely that unemployed migrants from the construction, hospitality and manufacturing sectors may be moving to even less well-paid and more insecure jobs in agriculture. Thus, the recession has brought a reversal of an established pattern but at the same time demonstrates the coping strategies of the migrants themselves to adjust to the new economic realities and to survive through the recession in situ. A coping strategy has been imposed at least partially by the impact of the recession on conditions in countries of origin.

One consequence of the increased numbers of the unemployed in developed countries is that more people are choosing to pursue further education. For example, enrolment in nursing in the United Kingdom increased by 24 per cent in 2009 compared with a year earlier and enrolment in hospitality, leisure, tourism and transport courses was up by 17.4 per cent and general engineering by 12.6 per cent. These are all fields in which migrants from other countries have figured prominently. Thus, the increase in the numbers of UK nationals being trained in these fields may mean a decline in the demand for workers from developing countries in certain critical areas which are deemed essential for development. Consequently, skill losses may decline and retention rates increase in key areas such as health in parts of the developing world.

Russia is a destination for some 12 million migrants, the vast majority from CIS countries and particularly Central Asia. Given its patterns of low fertility and increasing mortality, the Russian population declined from 148 million in 1992 to 142 million in 2007, and without migration would have shrunk even more. Nevertheless, with an economy based upon the export of oil and gas, the current recession has hit the economy hard, with the numbers of unemployed increasing from 6 to 7.5 million in the first quarter of 2009 alone to represent 10 per cent of the labour force. More than 40 per cent of migrant workers were employed in the construction sector and have been particularly hard hit, yet their home economies in Central Asia are also weak. Those who have returned see no alternative but to go back to Russia or to try for jobs in other countries such as the Republic of Korea or the Czech Republic, another example of coping strategies.
Countries of origin

Some 37 per cent of the world's 200 million people living in countries different from that in which they were born have moved from countries in the Global South to the Global North. A further 24 per cent move within the south, often to middle-income developing economies. In origin countries, in terms of migration management, policies and practices are likely to be more reactive to the consequences of the recession, such as deterioration of socio-economic conditions, rising unemployment, possible returns, and potential falls in remittances. Although data on returns are sparse, the information available so far suggests that large-scale returns have not occurred from most developed countries. As noted above, even where destination countries such as Spain have attempted to encourage return, the actual numbers going back have been limited, although anecdotal evidence points to some return of Poles from the United Kingdom and of migrants from Central Asian countries from Russia. The governments of a number of origin countries such as the Philippines, Uzbekistan and Nepal have initiated programmes to assist returnees. For example, in December 2008, using its established protection and assistance system, the Philippine government launched emergency measures for returning migrant workers. This has also had an influence on policies in countries like Nepal. However, the initial experience of implementing these measures shows their limited reach. Measures are aimed at regular returning migrants who have been made unemployed because their contracts were prematurely terminated as a result of the crisis. Irregular migrants must rely solely on self-help and informal support structures. However, return is an integral part of almost all temporary labour migration systems and little evidence exists to suggest that returns have as yet been abnormally high and sufficient to cause major problems to governments.

Whilst no financial support is offered to returning irregular migrants, in the wake of the crisis there have been increased awareness-raising measures in the mass media and information campaigns for specific target groups aimed at drawing attention to the dangers of irregular migration. In Nepal, there have been not only general awareness-raising measures but also an information campaign run by the government in cooperation with UNIFEM to make domestic workers aware of how to assert their rights. In Uzbekistan, crisis centres have been established to support people who are in dire need or who have become the victims of people trafficking. Other measures taken by the Uzbek government to combat the crisis focus mainly on improving employment and living conditions in rural areas, which is where most labour migrants come from and return to. Measures concentrate on the following three areas: (1) creation of loan facilities, (2) job creation and rural development, and (3) greater protection for migrants. In Malaysia, the government has announced repatriation assistance for Malaysian workers losing their jobs abroad, and the Keralan government in India has announced a scheme for providing low-cost loans to migrants returning from the Gulf.

Perhaps more important will be the impact of the recession on the millions who move internally within developing countries themselves. Sharp reductions in demand for goods across the developed world will
have an impact on centres of labour-intensive manufacturing in special economic zones and cities across the developing world as well as for raw materials that are sourced in developing countries. The impacts of lay-offs in mining centres and in labour-intensive manufacturing on the internal movement of people have yet to be fully assessed. However, some 8,100 workers appeared to lose their jobs in mining in Zambia in 2008, Kenya suffered a 35 per cent drop in exports of flowers, which led directly or indirectly to a loss of 1,200 jobs, and a recorded 51,000 workers were laid off in the garment industry in Cambodia between September 2008 and March 2009, for example. Given the declining opportunities in the developed world, remaining in the cities, perhaps eking out a livelihood in the informal sector, or returning to their homes in the villages seem more likely options. Estimates have been made of between 10 and 20 million returnees from coastal industrial areas of southern China, where factories have reduced production as a result of the collapse of demand in the United States and Europe. China's policy response has been an enormous stimulus package of some US$586 billion that will focus on increasing domestic demand. This will be spent on infrastructure, particularly roads, railways and airports, and on raising rural incomes through land reform, as well as social welfare projects. The non-urban nature of some of this spending may be a factor in both alleviating the conditions for returnees to the countryside and encouraging them to go back in the first place. China still has a rapidly growing economy and vast foreign exchange reserves and presents a very different case from most developing countries. The Overseas Development Institute of the UK has generated estimates that show an expected doubling or tripling in the numbers of poor in a range of the poorest countries across the developing world as a result of the recession. Quite what the above trends imply for migration in a country like China or in much poorer parts of the world is as yet unknown.

The impact varies across gender. In the destination countries, the major impact of job losses for migrants has fallen on sectors in which males predominated, the construction and manufacturing sectors. In the more developed parts of the developing world, the impact falls on labour-intensive manufacturing and particularly the garment and footwear sectors in which women predominate. In the poorest countries, whose economies are based on raw material extraction, again males predominate. Nevertheless, women are generally more likely to face discrimination than men, and the risk exists that they face a “double discrimination” because of their status of migrants and as women. Additionally, women migrant workers are concentrated in sectors that tend to be less regulated and may therefore be more vulnerable during economic downturn and consequent job loss. This kind of discrimination can be addressed through programmes such as Greece’s ‘Integrated interventions in favour of women’, which provides advice services and job training to vulnerable women, including female migrants. Falling remittance flows may also affect women’s empowerment where women are typically recipients of remittances and they are likely to be affected by any prolonged downturn in remittance flows. Policy responses will have to be geared to the very specific contexts of the countries in question.
Not only do these countries have to deal with increases in the numbers of domestic unemployed and a rise in poverty but remittances from overseas are likely to decline markedly for countries such as Mexico, Moldova or Tajikistan, which are heavily dependent on migrants’ earnings overseas. Remittances have also been affected by the relative devaluation of the United States dollar and the ruble, in which so many migrants receive their remuneration. Given the deteriorating employment situation in much of the developed world, increasing outmigration in the hope of generating more remittances is not a policy option. Quite the reverse, some countries of origin are faced with the prospect of having to absorb increasing numbers of their citizens who are returning after losing their jobs overseas.

While migrants have returned to their home countries, the number of returnees as yet has been relatively small compared with the numbers working overseas. For example, 400 Indonesians were returned from Jordan in June 2009 from perhaps 30,000 Indonesians in that country, and these were removed for visa infringements rather than for any specific crisis-related issue. The number of Bangladeshis in Malaysia, whose work visas were revoked, represented less than 10 per cent of the Bangladeshi migrant population in that country at the time. It is important to keep in mind that return is a normal part of all labour migration systems and there is little evidence that return is now significantly higher than might be expected. A survey taken in Moldova in March 2009, a country profoundly affected by emigration, showed that about one quarter of those who returned “definitively” did so because they lost their job or their salary had been terminated. Only 11 per cent of those who returned “temporarily” did so for these reasons.

**Suggestions and proposals for policy makers**

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned is the separation of long-term from short-term trends in the migration and development nexus. Migration is going to continue primarily because of deep inequalities in the global system. Certainly, new destinations emerge as rapidly growing economies that were once part of the developing world come to challenge traditional destinations in North America, Australasia and Europe. These economies to date have been primarily located in East Asia but nuclei of rapid development can also be identified in the Middle East, South Asia, Southern Africa and parts of Latin America. The migration to these areas, as well as to more traditional destinations, will resume after the current crisis is over. Hence, it is important for governments in both destination and origin countries not to embark upon policies only for the short term. Countries need to continue to prepare for the migrants they need after the crisis is over, and should consider the role that migrants can play in resuming economic growth. Tightened immigration controls in destination countries could make it more difficult for them to respond to changing labour market needs during the recovery, and could therefore damage economic prospects in destination countries. In terms of countries of origin, the available evidence suggests that worst-case scenarios of massive return and significant diminution of remittances are unlikely to happen, but careful monitoring will be required to determine if there are exceptions to this rule.
That generalization made, however, it is also clear that no simple or single policy response can be appropriate. A huge variation exists among both destination and origin countries in terms of their patterns of migration and levels of development. Clearly, some points can be emphasized, such as:

- the need for improving data collection and better sharing so that policy can be based on the best available evidence
- the need for data to be gender-disaggregated whenever possible, and gender issues to be considered in development partnerships
- the need to consider the impact of the downturn on the migration and development nexus in ongoing development work and planned future partnerships.

Questions to guide the discussion:

- How can governments limit the negative impact of the financial and economic crisis on the development benefits of migration?
- Can partnerships between destination and origin countries usefully be established to address these issues, and/or support institutional capacity building?
- Is there evidence of specific impacts on vulnerable groups such as women?
- What can origin countries learn from the experience of others in terms of appropriate policy responses?
- How can governments ensure that medium and long-term migration and development needs continue to be met?
- What policies and practical measures can be adopted to prepare for the upturn?
- Does the crisis create opportunities, such as countries of origin potentially benefiting from the skills of returnees, perhaps by providing training for returnees to meet domestic needs? What policy decisions can be taken to harness such skills?
- How can governments integrate the migration and development nexus into recovery efforts?

Proposed outcomes:

- There is a need for data collection and sharing, and sharing of experience of the impact of relevant policies, so that policy responses to the crisis can be based upon the best available evidence.
- Establish partnerships between origin and destination countries in order to encourage the development benefits from the migration and development nexus more successfully, especially in light of the current crisis.
- Countries should consider the impact of the downturn on the migration and development nexus in national and global recovery efforts.
Key reading


